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Renewables and drop in  electricity prices
Electricity prices become
ridiculously low. 
Highly dependant on the price
of gas. 
With the energy-only market, 
no new investments will be
made anymore, except if (i)
they are subsidised (ii) they
take place in a microgrid-like
structure (= no grid fees, no 
taxes) 
Low electricity prices and investments
The two burning questions in electricity
market design 
Context: The world is very likely to switch towards a 100% renewable
energy mix.
Question 1: How to create a non-subsidised EU (or worldwide) 
electricity market that synthetises a price signal fostering investments
in renewable energy?  
With the current market design, 
prices will increasingly be set by the 
load and storage, which may lead to 
(i) low average prices (ii) a highly

















Current incentives for having enough supply are 
not sufficient. But what are these current
(negative) incentives in Belgium? 
(i) A price of 3000 €/MWh for electricity bought
on the day-ahead market in case of lack of supply
(ii) An imbalance tarif equal to 4500 €/MWh.
Question 2: How to ensure that there is enough capacity to supply the 
load at any time? 
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If MWhs were bananas
Retailers cannot buy enough electricity on the wholesale market when
there is a lack of supply? 
Answer: If the retailer cannot convince his
customers to consume less, the TSO reduces its
consumption and disconnect them from the grid. IT 
is possible to do it with smart meters. 
Issues: (i) Required technology cannot easily be put in place (ii)
Poor people are likely to be frequently disconnected since they will
be unable to buy a high level of security of supply (iii) Issues of 
transparency for customers.
Capacity mechanisms
An increasing number of analysts believe that capacity mechanisms
that make separate capacity revenues available to generators and/or 
demand response are needed to ensure generation adequacy. 
As a consequence, several Member States have 
already opted for the introduction of one or 
more capacity mechanisms to address 
perceived residual market failures. 
Mechanisms vary widely - they may fall within the category of state aid.
(i) Difficulties for loads – especially small ones – to take part 
to capacity mechanisms.  
(iii) What is the place of renewables/storage within capacity
mechanisms?
(ii) Problems of interference between
capacity mechanisms and transmission/ 
distribution networks (loop-flows, 
congestions at the distribution level, etc.)
The perfect capacity mechanism: difficulties ahead
(iv) What about nuclear energy and capacity mechanisms?
Capacitity mechanisms: the «EU taxonomy »
Targeted
Volume-based Price-based
















See: Capacity  mechanisms working group, 30 June 2015, HIGH LEVEL COMPARISON OF CAPACITY MECHANISM MODELS AND 
COMPATIBILITY WITH STATE AID GUIDELINES
Targeted Market-wide
What I think of these mechanisms (in short)
1. Tenders for new capacity: May not favour enough emerging technologies like DG + 
Storage. May be required in case of nuclear phase-out. 
2. Strategic reserve: OK as a temporary solution. But why removing the generators of 
the strategic reserve from the market (except when there is an adequacy problem)?  
3. Targeted capacity payment: Simple to put in place but no competition/innovation. 
Beneficial that the units still stay in the market. 
4. Central buyer: Will lead to payments to generators that would still be in activity even
without these payments. Problems of market power. Good solution for fostering large-
scale investments in generation. Will foster innovation and competition. 
5. De-central obligation: Same drawbacks as in the « Central buyer » model, but may
favour more competition and innovation. May lead to problems of transparency. 
6. Market-wide capacity payment: Does not foster innovation/competition and will lead 
to payments to generators that are already bankable. 
Targeted capacity payment for Belgium?  
In Belgium, there are around 4000 
MW of gas-fired power plants which
are not competitive (now) and at risk
of closure.  This may create a capacity
problem in Belgium. Real risk will
occur when Germany proceeds to its




Targeted capacity payments to these power plants would be simple to put in place and 
effective in avoiding any risk of shortage of supply. The total payments necessary for 
maintaining them in operation would be around 100 million euros per year. This 
solution may be the cheapest one for ensuring security of supply in Belgium, even
after the German nuclear phase-out. 
